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COMMENTS 
EVIDENCE-RULES OF EVIDENCE IN DISBARMENT, HABEAS 
CoRPus, AND GRAND JuRY PROCEEDINGS-With the development of 
liberal trends in the admission of evidence/ and an increase in the 
number of non-jury type proceedings, exclusionary rules of 
evidence based on the theory of preventing the jury from being 
misled have been frequently disregarded. The disregard of some 
of these rules in administrative hearings,2 particularly workmen's 
compensation proceedings3 and deportation hearings,4 points the 
way to an examination of their value in other similar proceedings. 
Many statutory tribunals have taken the approach that they will 
admit all offered evidence, and let the appellate court disregard 
what it desires.11 Appellate courts have responded with the so-
called "residuum rule," holding that if, when all the incompetent 
evidence is disregarded, there still remains a residuum of com-
petent evidence to support the finding, the appellate courts will 
affirm.6 This liberal approach has been created, for the most part, 
by statutes governing the tribunals concerned.7 It is the purpose 
of this comment to examine three common-law proceedings in 
which rules of evidence are generally not governed by statute, to 
determine whether the liberalism expressed in administrative 
hearings has extended to non-statutory areas. Specifically, to what 
extent have the exclusionary rules of evidence, which rest on the 
1See Davis, "Evidence," 30 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1309 at 1314, 1319 (1955); comment, 46 
ILL. L. REv. 915 (1952); note, 60 YALE L.J. 363 (1951); Thompson, "Federal Rule 43 (a)-A 
Decadent Decade," 34 CoRN. L.Q. 238 (1948). But see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 at 
154 (1945). On the theory behind exclusion, see Cooper, "The Admissibility of Hearsay in 
Hearings before Workmen's Compensation Commissioners," 31 DICTA 423 at 424 (1954). 
2 See Vanderbilt, "Proof before Administrative Tribunals," 24 IowA L. REv. 464 (1939); 
Henoch, "Evidence before Administrative Tribunals," 22 I.C.C. PRACTITIONER'S JOURNAL 
395 (1955); Nonvood, "Administrative Evidence in Practice," 10 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 15 
(1941). 
3 See Cooper, "The Admissibility of Hearsay in Hearings before Workmen's Compen-
sation Commissions," 31 DICTA 423 (1954); 2 LARsllN, WORKMEN'S CoMPENSATION 287 (1952); 
Barnes, "Hearsay in Compensation Cases," 4 U.S.C. SELDEN Soc. YEARBOOK 40 (1940); 
Nonvood, "Administrative Evidence in Practice," 10 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 15 (1941). 
4See VANVLECK, ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932); notes, 3 GEO. WASH, L. 
REv. 104 (1934); 23 TEX. L. REv. 386 (1945). But see note, 33 GEO. L.J. 108 at 110 (1944), 
calling for strong rules of evidence in denaturalization proceedings. See also Bridges v. 
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). 
5 See McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 137 (1954); Davis, "Evidence," 30 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1309 
at 1315 (1955). 
6 Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916). See Davis, "The 
Residuum Rule in Administrative Law," 28 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 1 (1955). 
7 Administrative Procedure Act, §7 (c), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. (1958) §1006 (c). 
For state statutes, see HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 332 
(1944). 
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theory of preventing the jury from being misled (the "jury 
theory"), been abandoned in disbarment, habeas corpus, and 
grand jury proceedings? 
I. WHO HEARS THE EVIDENCE? APPLICATION OF RULES 
A. Disbarment Proceedings 
1. Although right to trial by jury is given in a few states, the 
trier of facts in a disbarment proceeding usually consists of one or 
more judges or selected members of the local bar.8 The proceed-
ing is generally regarded as civil in nature,9 despite the fact that a 
few courts make reference to the punishment aspects of disbar-
ment,10 and most require a quantum of proof similar to that 
needed for conviction in criminal proceedings.11 
Interpreting the proceeding as civil in nature removes con-
stitutional jury requirements and permits a more liberal approach 
to the exclusionary rules than if disbarment were considered 
criminal in nature. Further justification for liberality of admission 
of evidence comes from frequent reference to disbarment as a sui 
generis action regulating the conduct of the court.12 
2. Although some courts stringently apply the common-law 
rules of evidence to disbarment,13 and others take an extremely 
liberal approach,14 it can generally be said that the common-law ex-
s See Potts, "Trial by Jury in Disbarment Proceedings," 11 TEX. L. REv. 28 (1932) 
9Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); In re Kohler, 240 App. Div. 501, 270 N.Y.S. 634 
(1934); Houtchens v. State, (Tex. Comm. App. 1933) 63 S.W. (2d) 1011, reversing 47 S.W. 
(2d) 679 (1932). Holding it "quasi-civil," see Board of Law Examiners v. Brown, 53 Wyo. 
42, 77 P. (2d) 626 (1937). Holding it "quasi-criminal," see Ex parte Messer, 228 Ala. 16, 
152 s. 244 (1933). 
10 See In re Harris, 88 N.J.L. 18, 95 A. 761 (1915); Lantz v. State Bar of California, 
212 Cal. 213 at 220, 298 P. 497 (1931), speaking of disbarment as "adequate punishment"; 
State v. Quarles, 158 Ala. 54 at 57, 48 S. 499 (1909). 
11 Thus, "clear and convincing" evidence is required by Florida ex rel. Florida Bar 
Assn. v. Bass, (Fla. 1958) 106 S. (2d) 77; demanding "cogent and compelling proof," see 
In re McDonald, 204 Minn. 61,284 N.W. 888 (1939), 208 Minn. 330, 294 N.W. 461 (1940). 
12 See Potts, "Disbarment Procedure," 24 TEX. L. R.Ev. 161 at 163 (1945); Leimer v. 
Hulse, 352 Mo. 451 at 462, 178 S.W. (2d) 335 (1944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 744 (1944). 
13 Sheiner v. State, 9 Fla. Supp. 121, 82 S. (2d) 657 (1955) (rejecting incompetent 
evidence); People ex rel. Kent v. Denious, 118 Colo. 342, 196 P. (2d) 257 (1948) (rejecting 
immaterial evidence); In re Felton, 60 Idaho 540, 94 P. (2d) 166 (1939) (rejecting privi-
leged evidence); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assn. v. Amos, 246 Ill. 299, 92 N.E. 857 (1910) 
(rejecting trial transcript as sole evidence); Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 
S.W. 948 (1915) (rejecting prejudicial affidavit); In re Reed, 207 La. 1013, 22 S. (2d) 552 
(1945) (rejecting hearsay but only if clearly inadmissible); In re Sizer, (Mo. App. 1939) 
134 S.W. (2d) 1085. 
14 Werner v. State Bar, 24 Cal. (2d) 611, 150 P. (2d) 892 (1944) (admitting hearsay); 
State v. Dawson, (Fla. 1959) 111 S. (2d) 427 (stating at 431 that the "referee is not bound 
by technical rule of evidence," and admitting hearsay conversations); In re Scott, 53 Nev. 
24, 292 P. 291 (1930) (admitting letters without foundation). 
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clusionary rules are only moderately relaxed in disbarment pro-
ceedings. The attitude varies somewhat depending upon who hears 
the evidence. When a jury is employed, common-law rules are 
employed virtually to their full extent;15 when a committee of 
attorneys or a judge hears the case, a more relaxed approach can 
be expected.16 
Thus in an Alabama jury trial, the appellate court affirmed 
the lower court's rejection as hearsay of a statement made by a 
witness that defendant had effected a sale of property for her.17 
Defendant had tried to get the statement in as an admission against 
interest, but the court followed the usual rule in noting that there 
was no showing by defendant that the conversation was a deliberate 
statement by the speaker of any fact then appearing to be against 
her interest. A concurring judge felt the statement was clearly 
against her pecuniary interest, for if she deeded the property it 
was clearly beyond her recall.18 Moreover, she had died before the 
trial, and the concurring judge felt that declarations by decedents 
should be admitted, if deceased had a peculiar means of knowing 
the matter stated, if the statement was opposed to her pecuniary 
interest, and if she had no intention to misrepresent it.19 
On the other hand, a more liberal approach was apparent in a 
recent Florida disbarment hearing before a Board.20 The Board 
admitted hearsay conversations between defendant's aide and 
various clients. The appellate court affirmed the disbarment 
order, and said that the hearing is not "circumscribed by technical 
rules of evidence, usually attendant on the trial of an action in the 
courts. It is more nearly in the nature of a quasi-judicial admin-
istrative hearing until it reaches this court for decision."21 
No matter who adjudicates the facts, the quantum of evidence 
required for conviction remains the same.22 Although all the 
courts pay lip-service to the theory that only "legal" and "com-
15 Thomas v. Georgia, 95 Ga. App. 699, 99 S.E. (2d) 242 (1957) {excluding correspond-
ence as hearsay); McCord v. State ex rel. Allen, 220 Ala. 466, 126 S. 873 (1930) (rejecting 
conversation as hearsay); Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S.W. 948 (1915) (for-
bidding reading of ex parte affidavits to jury). 
16Wemer v. State Bar, 24 Cal. (2d) 611, 150 P. (2d) 892 (1944); In re Disbarment 
Proceedings, 321 Pa. 81, 184 A. 59 (1936); In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291 (1930). 
17 McCord v. State ex rel. Allen, 220 Ala. 466, 126 S. 873 (1930). 
18 Id. at 478. 
19Ibid. 
20 State v. Dawson, (Fla. 1959) 111 S. (2d) 427. 
21 Id. at 431. 
22 See 105 A.L.R. 976 (1936) for a review of the quantum of evidence required for 
conviction. 
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petent" evidence should be admitted,23 the terms are sufficiently 
ambiguous that any evidence which the court feels should be 
admitted can usually qualify. Some courts will admit all tendered 
evidence, and leave it to the appellate court to strike what it con-
siders incompetent.24 This reliance upon the appellate court, 
coupled with the appellate court's confidence in lower court 
findings of fact, presents a paradox. An Arkansas court seems 
to have fallen into the trap in a case in which the appellate court 
noted that much of the evidence admitted below was incompetent 
and irrelevant but admitted with a view to later appellate review.215 
After so stating, the appellate court held that since the lower court 
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, its 
conclusion should be respected. The result seems to be that the 
decision was founded on the lower court's opinion of the demeanor 
of the witnesses rather than on what the witnesses had to say. 
Proceeding to a more particular analysis of the individual ex-
clusionary rules, it appears that the greatest controversy centers 
upon hearsay. The area is not settled. Some courts will speak in 
language indicating that they will admit any hearsay; but then they 
admit only that evidence falling in well-recognized exceptions to 
the hearsay rule.26 Other courts will occasionally indicate strict 
adherence to the common-law rules, but in deciding the case view 
the evidence with a liberal eye. One New York court threw out 
all the evidence going toward disbarment, except some hearsay 
testimony falling within an exception to the hearsay rule.27 The 
court affirmed the conviction. If a general rule had to be drawn, 
it would be that despite the liberal statements by the courts, few 
of them will admit evidence clearly objectionable as hearsay. In 
one case the investigating committee attached an affidavit to the 
23In re Felton, 60 Idaho 540, 94 P. (2d) 166 (1939); Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Ala. 
91, 12 S. (2d) 314 (1943); In re Richardson, 209 Cal. 492, 288 P. 669 (1930). 
24 See Hurst v. Bar Rules Committee, 202 Ark. 1101, 155 S.W. (2d) 697 (1941); In re 
Richardson, 209 Cal. 492, 288 P. 669 (1930), where the lower court struck what it felt was 
incompetent evidence at the end of the hearing. The appellate court, at 498, felt sufficient 
competent evidence remained thereafter to support the finding. See also Louisiana State 
Bar Assn. v. Sackett, 231 La. 655 at 659, 92 S. (2d) 571 (1957), holding that lower court 
could admit all evidence, provided objections made and reservations taken by either side 
were preserved in the record. 
25 Hurst v. Bar Rules Committee of the State of Arkansas, 202 Ark. 1101, 155 S.W. 
(2d) 697 (1941). 
26 In Werner v. State Bar, 24 Cal. (2d) 611, 150 P. (2d) 892 (1944), the court admitted 
conversations because it said the hearsay rule did not apply when the statement is not 
admitted to prove the truth of its contents; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 A. 497 (1907), 
admitting transcript of former trial, because the issues and the parties were the same as in 
the instant proceedings, without mention of unavailability. 
27 In re Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 161 (1880). 
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complaint;28 the reading of the affidavit to the jury was severely 
criticized on appeal.29 Attempts to admit a conversation clearly 
not within any of the hearsay exceptions,80 or other testimony not 
subject to cross-examination,81 have met with failure. In one case 
letters attached to the record were sent to the appellate court, in 
support of defendant's integrity.82 This was labelled a reprehen-
sible practice and called hearsay. In actual practice, then, dis-
regarding the surplus of liberal statements, only a few courts will 
admit statements clearly hearsay.83 
The usual exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as the admission 
against interest,34 are allowed to about the same extent as in regular 
civil proceedings. In the area of admission of prior recorded 
testimony, however, the courts have become quite liberal in allow-
ing proffered testimony.35 In a Missouri disbarment proceeding, 
the hearing officer admitted the entire bar committee transcript, 
although defendant objected to it in its entirety;86 the committee 
said that the transcript contained at least some competent evidence, 
and so it was not necessary "to separate the wheat from the chaff ...• 
The inquiry (in disbarment cases) should not be limited, or cir-
cumscribed, by the strict rules of evidence.''37 Despite the liberal-
ity in this area, the opportunity for cross-examination, as a prin-
ciple, is given much lip-service.38 
28 Houtchens v. State, (Tex. Comm. App. 1933) 63 S.W. (2d) 1011, reversing 47 S.W. 
(2d) 679 (1932). 
29 Id. at 1014. 
SO In re Felton, 60 Idaho 540, 94 P. (2d) 166 (1939); In re Gorsuch, 147 Kan. 459, 78 
P. (2d) 12 (1938). 
31 Sheiner v. State, 9 Fla. Supp. 121, 82 S. (2d) 657 (1955). 
82 Allen v. State Bar, 218 Cal. 19, 21 P. (2d) 107 (1933). 
33 Matter of Pollack, 246 App. Div. 2II, 285 N.Y.S. 344 (1936); Matter of Solovei, 250 
App. Div. II7, 293 N.Y.S. 640 (1937) (disbarment dismissed), affd. 250 App. Div. 876, 297 
N.Y.S. 160 (1937); Campbell v. Third Dist. Comm., 179 Va. 244, 18 S.E. (2d) 883 (1942). 
34 Admissions against interest: In the Matter of Pate, 232 Mo. App. 478, 107 S.W. (2d) 
157 (1938); In re Gladstone, (S.D. N.Y. 1939) 28 F. Supp. 858 at 871 (dicta); In re Gorsuch, 
147 Kan. 459, 78 P. (2d) 12 (1938). See also McCord v. State ex rel. Allen, 220 Ala. 466, 
126 s. 873 (1930). 
85 In re Donaghy, 393 Ill. 621, 66 N.E. (2d) 856 (1946) (re character of witness); State 
v. Mosher, 128 Iowa 82, 103 N.W. 105 (1905) and In re Wellcome, 23 Mont. 259, 58 P. 7II 
(1899) (allowed under statute because held "special proceeding"); State v. Bomer, 179 
Tenn. 67, 162 S.W. (2d) 515 (1942) and Ex parte Messer, 228 Ala. 16, 152 S. 244 (1933) 
(admissible because disbarment not considered a criminal proceeding). 
86 In the Matter of Pate, 232 Mo. App. 478, 107 S.W. (2d) 157 (1938). 
87 Id. at 482-483. 
88 In re Melin, 410 Ill. 332, 102 N.E. (2d) ll9 (1951); In re Eaton, 14 Ill. (2d) 338, 152 
N.E. (2d) 850 (1958) (upheld against defendant); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. 
v. Bachelor, 139 Neb. 253, 297 N.W. 138 (1941) (testimony without cross-examination ad-
missible only for purpose of credibility). 
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Departure from rules requiring relevancy and materiality is 
rarely permitted.89 However, a California court held in one case 
that the local commissioner, and the board of governors, can con-
sider any past conduct of defendant in determining his integrity.40 
Facts disclosed on prior investigation by the state bar of complaints 
filed and regularly brought before it could also be considered. 
Another California court granted defendant the right to prove the 
integrity of his practice in another state.41 
Character evidence is acceptable and used,42 but evidence re-
garding similar transactions meets the same limitations imposed in 
other proceedings. Thus evidence of similar transactions has been 
admitted only to show scienter, or intent and a common plan.43 
For example, when a New York lawyer was charged with false 
representations regarding his ownership of stock, and with causing 
a loss to a broker he refused to pay, the referee in a disbarment 
proceeding admitted evidence of similar transactions by de-
fendant.44 
B. Habeas Corpus Proceedings 
1. The evidentiary problems created in habeas corpus differ 
somewhat from disbarment, in that the trier of the facts is always a 
judge; and, unlike the dispute over the nature of disbarment, 
habeas corpus is universally considered a civil proceeding.45 This 
holds true even in habeas corpus proceedings related to criminal 
cases, such as extraditions and writs requesting release from im-
prisonment. 
2. In general the usual rules of evidence designed for an 
ordinary civil trial are followed in habeas corpus. The liberal 
tendencies found in disbarment do not appear in habeas corpus. 
Turning to an analysis of the cases, it appears that rules govern-
39 Thomas v. Georgia, 95 Ga. App. 699, 99 S.W. (2d) 242 (1957) (evidence subsequent to 
relevant act excluded); In re Welansk.y, 319 Mass. 205, 65 N.E. (2d) 202 (1946) (holding 
court cannot retry criminal conviction); In re Sizer, 134 S.W. (2d) 1085 (1939) (exhibits 
regarding suits pending elsewhere excluded); In re McDonald, ll2 Mont. 129, II3 P. (2d) 
790 (1941) (holding mental capacity of prosecutrix immaterial). 
40 Hennessy v. State Bar, 18 Cal. (2d) 685, II7 P. (2d) 326 (1941). 
41 State Bar v. Rollinson, 213 Cal. 36, 1 P. (2d) 428 (1931). 
42 See notes 40 and 41 supra. 
43 In re Kohler, 240 App. Div. 501, 270 N.Y.S. 634 (1934). 
44Ibid. 
45 People ex rel. Borelli v. Lohman, 13 Ill. (2d) 506, 150 N.E. (2d) ll6 (1958); State 
v. Court of Common Appeals, 136 N.J.L. 380, 56 A. (2d) 562 (1948), affd. 1 N.J. 14, 61 A. 
(2d) 503 (1948). 
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ing relevancy and materiality provide most of the problems. Gen-
erally they are rigidly enforced.46 
Extradition hearings raise peculiar problems, as defendants 
often submit evidence of their innocence, which is not at issue in 
extradition. Courts have consistently rejected evidence of this 
type, as they have rejected evidence going to the motives of a 
complaining witness.47 A New Jersey court explained the reasons 
as follows: 
" ... Suchan inquiry [into motive], if allowed, might well 
result in endless trials on vague, and ill-formed issues, requir-
ing witnesses and depositions from distant points, testifying 
to no conclusive purpose. The end result might well be 
to embarrass the enforcement of the constitutional provision 
and, in many cases, would have the effect of total abrogation 
thereof. "48 
In habeas corpus requesting release from imprisonment, at-
tempts are often made to go outside the scope of the writ.49 In one 
case petitioner called as his witness the officer in charge of the 
police station where he was booked.50 The lower court refused to 
allow the officer to be questioned as to why he was no longer on the 
force, holding that this was outside the scope of the writ of habeas 
corpus granted. The appellate court agreed that the proffered 
evidence was immaterial, and affirmed the lower court decision. 
The result is typical of judicial approach to the relevancy rule in 
this area. 
The one area in which the relevancy rule is relaxed is in 
custody proceedings, where a wide scope is given admission of 
character and reputation evidence to prove fitness of a parent to 
receive the child.51 An Indiana court stated that inquiry could be 
46 People ex rel. Johnson v. Ruthazer, 198 Misc. 1044, 102 N.Y.S. (2d) 39 (1950), affd. 
278 App. Div. 95, 105 N.Y.S. (2d) 394 (1951); Bond v. Norwood, 195 Ga. 383, 24 S.E. (2d) 
289 (1943); McDowell v. Gould, 166 Ga. 670, 144 S.E. 206 (1928); Chambers v. State, 235 
Wis. 7, 291 N.W. 772 (1940); State ex rel. French v. French, 182 Tenn. 606, 188 S.W. (2d) 
603 (1945). 
47In re Cohen, 23 N.J. Super. 209, 92 A. (2d) 837 (1952), affd. 12 N.J. 362, 96 A. (2d) 
794 (1953). 
48 Id. at 224. 
49 United States ex rel. Daverse v. Hohn, (3d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 934 (holding 
immaterial allegation that juror was given a gun as reward for his services, calling this, at 
939, "far-fetched and an after-thought"); Salter v. Delmore, 50 Wash. (2d) 603, 313 P. 
(2d) 700 (1957); Ex parte Noble, 78 Okla. Cr. 105, 144 P. (2d) 122 (1943) (fact co-defendant 
allowed to plead guilty to manslaughter excluded). 
50 Commonwealth ex rel. Miller v. Maroney, 179 Pa. Super. 305, 116 A. (2d) 755 (1955). 
51 Sweeney, "Habeas Corpus - Custody of Children," 22 TEMPLE L.Q. 289 at 291 
(1949); In re Harville, 233 La. 1, 96 S. (2d) 20 (1957); Sturkie v. Skinner, 214 Ga. 264, 
104 S.E. (2d) 417 (1958). 
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made into the standing of the parties in the community, proximity 
to schools, and other advantages for the child.52 
The hearsay rule is universally enforced in habeas corpus,53 
with the exception of the deportation area.54 Even though there 
was no objection to the hearsay in om; Georgia case, the appellate 
court curtly overruled a lower court finding that a father had lost 
the right to his child;55 the lower court had admitted testimony 
by the grandmother that her daughter told her that her son-in-law 
beat their children. Similarly, the right to cross-examination is 
rigidly protected.56 Much litigation arises over the admission of 
reports and investigations, which are generally held inadmissible 
as hearsay.57 
In submitting written evidence, rules requiring the best 
evidence58 and authentication59 are enforced. The more specific 
rules regulating oral testimony are also followed; opinions60 and 
conclusions61 are forbidden, and competency62 is always investi-
gated. In one case a witness' testimony as to a judge's ability was 
ruled incompetent, because he based his opinion upon his casual 
observance of the judge as he saw him in the court house.63 
52 Johnson v. Smith, 203 Ind. 214 at 220, 176 N.E. 705 (1931). 
53Ex parte Nicely, 116 Tex. Cr. 143, 28 S.W. (2d) 147 (1930) (excluding wires, letters, 
and prison record as hearsay); Ex parte Foote, 106 Tex. Cr. 672, 294 S.W. 851 (1927); 
Walker v. Warden of Maryland House of Correction, 209 Md. 654, 121 A. (2d) 714 (1956) 
(letter of trial judge excluded). 
54 United States v. Brough, (2d Cir. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 377 at 379 (admitting hearsay 
statements for what they are worth, with "knowledge of the fact that there was no cross-
examination"). See also Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). 
55 Camp v. Camp, 213 Ga. 65, 97 S.E. (2d) 125 (1957). 
56 In re Dubina, 311 Mich. 482, 18 N.W. (2d) 902 (1945); Cobas v. Clapp, 79 Idaho 
419, 319 P. (2d) 475 (1958). 
57 Sweeney, "Habeas Corpus - Custody of Children," 22 TEMPLE L.Q. 289 at 298 (1949); 
United States ex rel. Esshoc v. Fluckey, (6th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 64 (official landing cer-
tificate admitted); United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Commanding Officer, (D.C. Neb. 
1945) 58 F. Supp. 933 (Department of Agriculture War Board Report to Local Selective 
Service Board that defendant was a "slacker" not admitted); United States ex rel. Leon v. 
Shaughnessy, (S.D. N.Y. 1956) 143 F. Supp. 270 (admitting certificates of supervising 
psychiatrist). 
58 United States ex rel. Esshoc v. Fluckey, (6th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 64. 
59 State ex rel. Hall v. Skeen, 136 W. Va. 805, 68 S.E. (2d) 683 (1952); In re Dubina, 
311 Mich. 482 at 486, 18 N.W. (2d) 902 (1945); Berry v. Gray, (Ky. 1957) 299 S.W. (2d) 124. 
60 United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Commanding Officer, (D.C. Neb. 1945) 58 F. Supp. 
933. 
61 Little v. Gladen, 202 Ore. 16, 273 P. (2d) 443 (1954). 
62 Cottrell v. McLeod, (Okla. Cr. 1959) 342 P. (2d) 240 (allowing officials with personal 
knowledge of testimony to supplement record); Ferguson v. Hoffman, 180 Kan. 139, 299 P. 
(2d) 596 (1956). 
63 United States ex rel. Feeley v. Ragen, (7th Cir. 1948) 166 F. (2d) 976. 
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C. Grand Jury Proceedings 
I. The nature and purpose of a grand jury hearing differ 
markedly from disbarment and habeas corpus. A grand jury hear-
ing is not aimed at a determination of guilt or innocence, or in-
vestigation of a particular fact or facts. Rather a grand jury is to 
determine whether a particular situation merits criminal indict-
ment. As a result, the investigation is often more broad and the 
issues more prevalent than in other hearings. The question arises 
as to the extent of the application of the exclusionary rules of 
evidence designed to aid a jury in achieving justice. 
2. In general, exclusionary rules of evidence before a grand 
jury are considerably less stringent than in either disbarment or 
habeas corpus. Significantly, because the grand jury system is 
most widely used in federal courts, evidentiary rules are liberalized 
in the federal courts to a greater extent than in state courts.64 A 
minority of jurisdictions adhere, at least nominally, to the cus-
tomary rules.65 Thus one Connecticut court held that a grand 
jury should not be restricted by the ordinary rules of evidence 
when questioning witnesses;66 the court added, however, in a 
qualification of doubtful value, that in deciding whether to indict, 
only evidence admissible at a trial should be considered. 
The courts universally agree that there must be some "legal" 
or "competent" evidence as a foundation for grand jury action,67 
but as in disbarment these terms serve little practical function. 
Analysis of specific cases indicates that the clearest violation of 
ordinary rules is found with regard to hearsay.68 The federal 
courts admit hearsay, 69 and the Supreme Court has supported an 
indictment based solely on hearsay.70 In Costello v. United States 
the Court indicated that incompetent evidence alone is sufficient 
for an indictment. Defendant in that case argued that the Fifth 
64 United States v. Scully, (2d Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 113 at 116, cert. den. 350 U.S. 897 
(1955); United States v. Garnes, (S.D. N.Y. 1957) 156 F. Supp. 467 at 470; Cain v. United 
States, (7th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 263 at 270. 
65 EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 142-143 (1906); In the Matter of Cole, 208 Misc. 697 at 
699-700, 145 N.Y.S. (2d) 748 (1955) (referring to statute requiring legal evidence); Royce 
v. Oklahoma, 5 Okla. 61 at 65 (1897) (hearsay testimony ruled out); Stern v. Superior 
Court, 78 Cal. App. (2d) 9 at 18, 177 P. (2d) 308 (1947) (dicta). 
66 State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60 at 71-72, 9 A. (2d) 63 (1939). 
67 In the Matter of Cole, 208 Misc. 697 at 699, 145 N.Y.S. (2d) 748 (1955); Royce v. 
Oklahoma, 5 Okla. 61 at 65 (1897); Gore v. State, 22 Ala. App. 136 at 137-138, 114 S. 791 
(1927), cert. den. 217 Ala. 68, 114 S. 794 (1927); EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 144 (1906). 
68 Cain v. United States, (7th Cir. 1956) 239 F. (2d) 263 (examiner's report); United 
States v. Smyth, (N.D. Cal. 1952) 104 F. Supp. 283 (writings). 
69 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
10 Id. at 363. 
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Amendment was thereby violated, but the Court stated that to so 
hold would cause great delay in grand jury hearings, and in effect 
give defendant a preliminary trial, which is not required by the 
Fifth Amendment.71 Although the state courts do not go this far, 
some do admit hearsay.72 Moreover the defendant is generally 
denied the right to cross-examine,73 and the grand jury need not 
hear his witnesses.74 Perhaps the most extreme exception to the 
usual rules of evidence permits the jurors to use their own knowl-
edge in evidence.711 
Relevancy and materiality are extremely broad in a grand jury 
hearing because of the breadth of the examination; yet honest at-
tempts are made to confine the evidence within the established 
scope of the investigation.76 In 1953 a federal grand jury was con-
sidering possible violation of conspiracy and perjury laws, with 
reference to non-communist affidavits executed by leaders of un-
affiliated labor unions. The grand jury's attempt to learn of the 
leaders' religious attitudes was sharply rebuked as irrelevant, "high-
ly improper," and "entirely out of order."77 
The subpoena duces tecum has provided difficult problems of 
relevancy, and yet it too has been curtailed.78 In one case a grand 
jury had been investigating criminal abortions in the county; a 
subpoena duces tecum issued by the grand jury, demanding hos-
pital records of all abortions, was held to be too broad.79 The 
subpoena would have uncovered other than criminal abortions. 
It appears, therefore, that despite the fact that the grand jury 
is composed of men unsophisticated in legal analysis, and despite 
71 Ibid. Burton, J., concurring, stated, at 364, that to indict a person on evidence not 
"rationally persuasive robs the Fifth Amendment of much of its protective value." 
72 Maddox v. State, 213 Ind. 537, 12 N.E. (2d) 947 (1938) (testimony); Hope v. People, 
83 N.Y. 418 (1881) (ex parte affidavits); People v. Lambersky, 410 ID. 451, 102 N.E. (2d) 
326 (1951) (reading of confession, apparently hearsay, allowed). 
73People v. Fernandez, 172 Adv. Cal. App. Rep. 920, 342 P. (2d) 309 (1959). See also 
People v. Blair, 33 N.Y.S. (2d) 183 (1942). 
74 People v. Gibson, 15 Misc. (2d) 642, 183 N.Y .s. (2d) 52 (1959) (based on statute); 
Commonwealth v. McNary, 246 Mass. 46, 140 N.E. 255 (1923); State v. Cox, 218 La. 278, 
49 S. (2d) 12 (1950) (based on statute). 
75 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at 65-66 (1906) (dicta); Goodman v. United States, (9th 
Cir. 1939) 108 F. (2d) 516 at 520 (dicta). 
76 Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 551, 42 S. (2d) 17 (1949); In re Pillo, 11 N.J. 8, 93 A. (2d) 
176 (1952), holding matters in doubtful relevance to be resolved in favor of the grand jury. 
77 Application of United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, (S.D. N.Y. 1953) 
111 F. Supp. 858 at 870. 
78 People v. Allen, 410 m. 508 at 516, 103 N.E. (2d) 92 (1952), cert. den. 344 U.S. 815 
(1952), stating that breadth of subpoena duces tecum is measured by scope of investigation. 
79 In the Matter of the Investigation into Alleged Commission of Criminal Abortions 
in the County of Kings, 286 App. Div. 270, 143 N.Y.S. (2d) 501 (1955). 
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the fact that exclusionary rules are enforced in certain areas, the 
exclusionary rules in the important area of hearsay are greatly re-
laxed in a grand jury proceeding. 
III. PHILOSOPHY BEHIND JUDICIAL CONCLUSIONS 
In examining the application of the usual exclusionary rules 
of evidence in three sui generis proceedings, our findings have been 
apparently inconsistent with the "jury theory" as to admission of 
certain evidence. 
In habeas corpus proceedings, which are heard by a judge, the 
usual exclusionary rules have been strictly followed. In grand 
jury hearings, held before a group of laymen, the rules have been 
greatly liberalized. Only in disbarment cases has there been a 
measure of consistency: when heard by a judge or a group of 
attorneys, rules of evidence have tended toward liberality. 
It seems that factors other than who hears the case are affecting 
application of the exclusionary rules of evidence. These factors 
may be briefly considered. 
A. Disbarment Proceedings 
An overriding factor in disbarment cases is the oft-expressed 
judicial feeling that the right to practice law is a privilege bestowed 
by the state, which the state can take away.80 Only a few 
courts limit this approach by stating that the privilege is not a mere 
indulgence bestowed by the state, revocable at will.81 The courts 
feel that when an attorney fails to adhere to standards required for 
practice, that privilege, like a license, can be summarily revoked. 
Analogy is made to the necessity of meeting standards before an 
attorney is allowed to practice.82 One court likened an attorney's 
good character to the virtue of a woman, it being his "chief jewel, 
and when he loses it he becomes a moral bankrupt."83 Obviously 
it is but a short step from this reasoning to the conclusion that 
what the state has given, the state can take away-and can do so 
unfettered by rules of evidence designed to protect the ordinary 
citizen in the ordinary case. 
80 In re Brown, 64 S.D. 87 at 96, 264 N.W. 521 (1936); State v. Mosher, 128 Iowa 82 at 
89, 103 N.W. 105 (1905); Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 at 320 (1949), referring to the 
privilege to practice before the Patent Office. 
81 State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Bachelor, 139 Neb. 253 at 255, 297 N.W. 
138 (1941). 
82 In re Wilson, 76 Ariz. 49 at 53, 258 P. (2d) 433 (1953); Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14 
at 22 (1897). 
83 Campbell v. Third District Comm., 179 Va. 244 at 249, 18 S.E. (2d) 883 (1942). 
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A second line of thought often advanced by the courts is that it 
is the court's privilege to supervise its officers.84 The courts say 
that judicial integrity,85 and the public welfare,86 require strict 
application of these supervisory powers. Frequently the courts 
have revealed an abiding fear that they will be accused of favoring 
their own unless they deal harshly with attorneys.87 The attitude 
seems to be that the conglomerate of public welfare and judicial 
integrity, coupled with internal supervisory powers, gives to the 
courts the right to relax evidentiary rules when dealing with "one 
of their own." 
Only a few courts base any liberalism shown upon the fact that 
a trained individual is hearing the facts. 
Although a lengthy discussion of the wisdom of the philosophy 
motivating any liberal trend in the area is beyond the scope of this 
comment, suffice to say that the generally-expressed rationale is 
not free from question. While it is true that in-order to practice 
law certain standards should be met, to call the practice of law a 
privilege is somewhat misleading. An attorney cannot constitu-
tionally be denied the right to practice if he has met the standards 
set. This "privilege" is not a mere grace bestowed out of the pure 
benevolence of the state, for the state-the public- benefits from a 
practicing lawyer's efforts. It seems that whatever it is called, the 
right or privilege once bestowed should not be revoked except 
under the most strict guides. 
Although labelled "civil," disbarment inflicts upon the at-
torney results frequently more severe than criminal conviction. 
Livelihood, honor, and self-esteem suffer just as swiftly from dis-
barment as from a criminal conviction. Since the rationale be-
hind evidentiary rules in criminal cases is also present in disbar-
ment, to call disbarment a civil proceeding or not really a punish-
ment, and hence susceptible to more liberal rules, appears to be 
but a costly game of semantics. 
The real significance of judicial explanations for any relaxation 
of the usual rules lies in their general failure to consider who hears 
the case. 
84 In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899), and In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 
N.W. 441 (1932), holding void statutory attempts to deprive the courts of this function. 
85 In re Sutt, 281 Ky. 724 at 728, 137 S.W. (2d) 398 (1940); Leimer v. Hulse, 352 Mo. 
451 at 462, 178 S.W. (2d) 335 (1944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 744 (1944). 
86 See In re Sutt, 281 Ky. 724 at 728, 137 S.W. (2d) 398 (1940); Board of Law Exam-
iners v. Brown, 53 Wyo. 42 at 50, 77 P. (2d) 626 (1937). 
87 In re Ashbach, 13 Ill. (2d) 411 at 419, 150 N .E. (2d) 119 (1958); Kingsland v. Dorsey, 
338 U.S. 318 at 326 (1949), Jackson, J., dissenting, said "courts lean backwards to avoid 
suspicion of partiality to men of our own profession." 
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B. Habeas Corpus Proceedings 
The rationale for the stringent enforcement of rules of evidence 
in habeas corpus proceedings cannot be gathered from judicial 
decisions alone, for the courts have rarely considered the reasons 
for their stringency. Their only explanation is that habeas corpus 
is a civil proceeding, and hence the usual rules apply. 
Undoubtedly there is an unexpressed rationale underlying this 
stringent enforcement in habeas corpus. The original and main 
purpose of the writ is to prevent illegal confinement of the peti-
tioner.88 It has always been considered a fundamental safeguard 
of personal liberty, 89 and is incorporated in the federal90 and most 
state constitutions. Indeed the ·writ has developed into a basic 
means of protection of all constitutional rights, for the issue in 
many habeas corpus writs is whether due process has been violated. 
Since the writ is not only a constitutional guarantee aimed at pro-
tecting personal liberty, but has become a foundation of protection 
of other rights, the courts may have been reluctant to deviate from 
rules intended to aid in the search for truth. Further, habeas 
corpus is generally permitted only after all other remedies have 
been exhausted;91 the realization that this is the petitioner's "last 
resort" might well influence the judiciary toward a careful scrutiny 
of all evidence submitted against petitioner. The difficulty with 
this reasoning, of course, is that careful scrutiny is a two-edged 
sword, affecting evidence advanced by petitioner as well. 
But whether the conclusion is that the courts have not sought 
a rationale for their enforcement, have not even considered the 
problem, or that the nature of habeas corpus has subconsciously 
influenced their thinking, the noteworthy point is that the courts 
have not considered who is hearing the case. The "jury theory" 
results in certain rules of evidence intended to aid jurors in their 
search for truth. Yet courts have given no consideration to the 
fact that in habeas corpus a judge hears the petition. The result 
has been that rules designed to help juries are governing admission 
of evidence by trained triers of fact. 
ss Chafee, "The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution,'' 32 Bosr. UNIV. 
L. REY. 143 at 143 (1952); comment, 51 CoL. L. REY. 368 (1951); Tapley, "Use of Habeas 
Corpus,'' 4 PORTLAND L. REY. 8 at 8 (1955). 
89 Longsdorf, "Habeas Corpus-A Protein Writ and Remedy," 10 Omo ST. L.J. 301 
at 307 (1949); Chafee, "The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution," 32 BoST. 
UNIV. L. REY. 143 at 143 (1952). 
90 Art. I, §9. 
91Notes, 47 MICH. L. REY. 720 at 721 (1949); 39 J. CluM:. L. 357 (1948); 97 UNIV. PA. 
L. REY. 285 (1948). 
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C. Grand Jury Proceedings 
As in disbarment, and apparently as in habeas corpus, the 
rationale of the courts for their approach to the exclusionary rules 
before a grand jury rests in the nature of the proceeding. Courts 
feel that it is the purpose of a grand jury to investigate, and since 
there are no issues formed prior to the hearing, the scope of the 
investigation should be quite broad. Moreover courts frequently 
express reluctance to grant defendants a "second trial" by imposing 
ordinary trial rules on the indictment level. 
It seems both reasons advanced by the courts for their liberal 
attitude are open to question. With respect to the scope of a 
grand jury investigation, many authorities criticize the tendency 
of grand juries to go on "fishing expeditions."92 Indeed, some 
writers feel that the grand jury has outlived its usefulness.93 It is 
agreed that when a grand jury is investigating a broad subject, such 
as the prevalence of criminal abortions within its jurisdiction,94 
the relevancy rule is difficult to apply. However, in the indictment 
of an individual for a particular crime, where the area is relatively 
narrow and the issues fairly well formulated, this reasoning is less 
acceptable. In the latter case, just as in an ordinary civil trial, 
these issues can provide a measuring-rod for relevancy. The sec-
ond reason advanced by the courts, that they do not wish in effect 
to grant defendants a preliminary trial, is also questionable. As 
in disbarment and habeas corpus, the courts have failed to consider 
who is hearing the case. Considering only the liberal approach 
taken with respect to hearsay, if hearsay were to gain probative 
value before a grand jury because of the nature of that proceeding, 
the attitude of the courts would be understandable. But it is clear 
that this is not the case. The objections to hearsay evidence before 
a petit jury should hold equal weight before a grand jury, since 
both are composed of men untrained in the art of analyzing 
evidence. 
1l2 See Lee, "The Powers and Duties of the Grand Jury," 8 BAYLOR L. REv. 194 at 196 
(1956); Dession and Cohen, "The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries," 41 YALE L.J. 
687 at 691 (1932); comment, 37 MINN. L. REv. 586 (1953); Ex parte Morris, 252 Ala. 551 
at 557, 42 S. (2d) 17 (1949); McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48 at 61, 187 A. 498 (1936); State 
v. Bramlett, 166 S.C. 323 at 328-329, 164 S.E. 873 (1932). 
93 See Konowitz, "The Grand Jury as an Investigating Body of Public Officials," IO 
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 219 at 228 (1936); REPORT OF NATIONAL COMMISSION ON I.Aw OBSER.V· 
ANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT, "Prosecution," 35, 36 (1931); Kranitz, "Grand Jury: Past-Present 
-No Future," 24 Mo. L. REv. 318 (1959); Canfield, "Have We Outgrown the Grand Jury?" 
40 ILL. B.J. 206 (1952); White, "In Defense of the Grand Jury," 25 PA. B.A.Q. 260 (1954). 
94 In the Matter of the Investigation into Alleged Commission of Criminal Abortions 
in the County of Kings, 286 App. Div. 270, 143 N.Y.S. (2d) 501 (1955). 
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IV. EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL APPROACH 
It is beyond the scope of this comment to consider whether the 
"jury theory" has an essential validity to it. Indeed it might be 
argued that the rules designed to aid the jury should be applied 
before certain less qualified judges and tribunals. At any rate, 
rules arising from this theory are still recognized in ordinary civil 
and criminal jury trials, indicating judicial feeling that these rules 
do aid the jury. An analysis of only three non-statutory common-
law proceedings has indicated that the question whether the rules 
should be enforced in a particular proceeding is given considera-
tion by the courts. But it appears that in deciding the question, 
the courts have consistently made the determining factor the 
nature of the proceeding. 
The nature of the proceeding should not be ignored. But it 
seems that the place for consideration of the nature of the pro-
ceeding should be in determining the quantum of evidence re-
quired for plaintiff to succeed, rather than in determining whether 
the evidence is admissible or not. If the "jury theory" has any 
validity, admissibility should be governed by who hears the case, 
and his or their relative capability to disregard misleading and 
irrelevant evidence. 
Perhaps the time has come for judicial or legislative re-appraisal 
of the "jury theory." If it is determined that the theory has a 
rational basis even in light of the more educated juror of today, 
the nature of the proceeding should not be considered in determin-
ing the admissibility of evidence. Rather, universal application 
of the ordinary rules should be applied before all juries, and liberal 
admission policies followed in non-jury proceedings. 
Paul S. Gerding, S.Ed. 
